In this article, we study computational uncertainties in probabilistic risk/safety assessment 1 resulting from the computational complexity of calculations of risk indicators. We argue that the 2 risk analyst faces the fundamental epistemic and aleatory uncertainties of risk assessment with a 3 bounded calculation capacity, and that this bounded capacity over-determines both the design of 4 models and the decisions that can be made from models.
by the taxonomy. Section 4 reviews state of the art algorithms for PRA/PSA Boolean model assessment 48 and explains what makes them efficient in practice. Section 5 reports and discusses experimental 49 results on large nuclear PSA models. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article. The first step of this process consists for the risk analyst in trying to understand how the system 54 works and how it may fail. Functional analysis, as defined in reference textbooks [6, 7] , is typically part 55 of this step although it does not cover it fully. The risk analyst works usually from system specifications 56 and not from the system itself as the latter (or the configuation under study of the latter) may not exist [6, 7] for reference textbooks) and related formalisms such as , Dynamic Flow Graphs
165
[12], multistate systems [13, 14] , and HiP-HOPS [15] .
166
In these formalisms, the system under study is assumed to consist of a finite number n of 167 components. Each component can be in a finite number of states, usually two (a component is either 168 working or failed). The state the ith component, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is described by means of a variable v i that 169 takes its value into a finite set of constants, like {0, 1} where 0 stands for working and 1 stands for 170 failed, called the domain of v i and denoted by dom(v i ). The state of the system is thus described by a 171 vectorv = v 1 , . . . , v n of variables that takes its value into the cartesian product ∏ n i=1 dom(v i ) of the 172 domains of the variables (which is indeed finite).
173
The set of states in which the system is failed is described by means of a Boolean formula f (v) 174 that is interpreted as a subset of ∏ n i=1 dom(v i ).
175
Each variable v i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is equipped with a probability distribution, i.e. a function that 176 associates with each value c ∈ dom(v i ) and each time t a certain probability p v i =c (t).
177
It is assumed that components are statistically independent. Therefore, the probability that the 178 system is in states = s 1 , . . . , s n at time t is simply as follows. 
From the above definitions, the following equality holds. pv =s (t)
In theory, p f (v) (t) is thus easy to assess. In practice, it is impossible to enumerate one by one all 181 of the (failed) states of the system because of the exponential blow-up of their number (more on that 182 point in the next section).
183
As already pointed out, probabilized Boolean formulas, because they assume components AltaRica LaBRI [26, 27] , AltaRica 29] and AltaRica 3.0 [30, 31] ) are other and more 193 structured ways to describe finite state automata.
194
In these formalisms, the state of the system is still described by a vectorv = v 1 , . . . , v n of 195 variables that take their values into finite domains dom(v i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The set of states in which the 196 system is failed is also still described by means of a Boolean formula f (v) that is interpreted as a subset
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The difference with probabilized Boolean formulas stands in the addition of:
199
-An initial stateῑ.
200
-A finite set of transitions that describe how the system changes of state under the occurrence of 201 events.
202
Transitions are triples E, g, a , denoted g E − → a, where:
203
-E is the event labeling the transition.
204
-g is a Boolean formula on the variables ofv. g is called the guard of the transition.
205
-a is an instruction that calculates the next values of the variables. ins and a(s) =t.
214
Each event E is equipped with a deterministic or probabilistic delay. The probability to be in the 215 states at time t is thus the sum of the probabilities of all possible sequences of transition firings that 216 lead from stateῑ at time 0 to states at time t. in the literature that work more or less in this way (Simula has been historically the first one, see e.g.
231
[36]).
232
In these formalisms, the state of the system is also described as a vectorv of variables encoding 
239
We gave here a presentation of models in terms of automata for the sake of uniformity. It is sometimes
240
easier to see models of this class as descriptions of hierarchical processes running in parallel. Each 241 component of the system is then seen as a process or an agent. During its execution, which may 242 end before the end of the execution of the system as a whole, a process may "fork" i.e. create some 243 sub-processes or clone processes.
Formalisms belonging to this class have the full power of programming languages.
245
The three classes we mentioned in this section are ordered by increasing computational complexity 246 of assessment algorithms, as we shall see now. 
Computational Complexity

248
Computational complexity theory is a branch of theoretical computer science that aims at 249 classifying problems according to the cost, in terms of computational resources, of solving them.
250
We shall recall here only fundamental results related to PRA/PSA. The reader interested in a broader 251 perspective should look at reference textbooks [37, 38] .
252
Computational complexity theory considers families of problems stated in mathematical terms.
253
Of course, the cost of solving a problem must be related to the size of this problem. consider instances of the same size, the complexity is characterized by means of a function f (n) such 262 that for any instance of size n of the problem, the number of steps of the algorithm is at most c. f (n), for 263 some predefined constant c. It is then said that this algorithm is in O( f (n)) (the big-O notation). For 264 instance, sorting the element of a list using the quick-sort algorithm is in O(n. log n), where n denotes 265 the number of elements of that list.
266
At this point, three important remarks can be made.
267
First, one can consider, aside this complexity in terms of the number of steps -called complexity of calculations, but we shall see that the complexity in space is usefull as well.
271
Second, we are speaking here of worst-case complexity. It is also possible to consider average 272 complexity, but results are then much more difficult to establish.
273
Third, we assumed in the above discussion that the problems at stake are decidable, i.e. that 274 there exist at least one algorithm to solve them. Some important practical problems (for instance the 275 equivalence of two computer programs) are however indecidable, i.e. it can be proved that no general 276 algorithm exists to solve them.
277
Decidable problems fall in one of the three following categories, with respect to their complexity.
278
-Provably easy problems, i.e. those for which algorithms with polynomial complexity are known.
279
These problems are said P-easy. Some of them are also P-hard, meaning that no algorithm with a 280 lower complexity than polynomial can be designed to solved them.
281
-Provably hard problems, i.e. those for which it can be proved that any algorithm has at least an 282 exponential complexity. These problems are said EXP-hard.
283
-Problems that are neither provably easy nor provably hard. There is a wide variety of very 284 practical such problems.
285
The above classification is rather rough as a problem in O(n 100 ) can hardly be considered as easy in 286 any practical sense. But very few such problems have been exhibited so far, so the classification is 287 widely accepted.
288
Till now, we spoke about problems in general. We need now to be more specific and to distinguish 289 decision problems and enumeration problems. A decision problem is a problem with an answer that is 290 either yes or no. An enumeration problem is a problem that consists in counting the number of yes 291 answers of a decision problem or, if a probability structure is defined over the possible answers, in 292 assessing the sum of the probabilities of the yes answers.
Here another two important remarks can be made.
294
First, a common point to decision and enumeration problems is that their answer can be encoded 295 in a small space compared to the size of the problem. This is not the case for all of the problems. 
339
The following question is one of the most intriguing of computer science.
As of today, it is still open.
341
Note that MONOTONE-SAT, i.e. the variant of SAT in which the formula f is coherent (monotone),
342
is trivially an easy problem (according to the our classification): it suffices to check whether the 343 valuation that assigns the value true to all variables satisfies f because if f is satisfied by a valuation it 344 must be satisfied by that one as well. We shall give in the next section a formal definition of coherence.
345
The class #P (read "sharp P", or "number P") gathers counting and reliability problems associated 346 with NP-hard problem (i.e. problems that are at least as hard as problems in the class NP). For instance,
347
#SAT is defined as follows.
348
#SAT: Let f be a Boolean formula. How many variable valuations satisfy f ?
349
This class has been introduced by Valiant [3] who showed the following theorem.
350
Theorem 2 (Complexity of #SAT [3]).
#SAT is #P-complete.
351
The two following additional properties are easy to show (see [38] ).
352
Property 1 (RELIABILITY versus #SAT). RELIABILITY is at least as hard as #SAT.
353
Property 2 (#MONOTONE-SAT versus #SAT). #MONOTONE-SAT, i.e. the problem of counting the 354 number of solutions of a coherent formula, is as hard as #SAT.
355
Valiant's theorem has been later completed by Toda.
356
Theorem 3 (Toda [4] ). PP is as Hard as the Polynomial-Time Hierarchy
357
It would go far beyond the scope of this paper to explain Toda's theorem. Intuitively, it says that if 358 one can count "for free" the number of solutions of a problem, then one is able to solve in polynomial 359 time all of the problems of the polynomial hierarchy, i.e. is very close to be able to solve in polynomial 360 time problems of exponential worst case complexity.
361
In a word, RELIABILITY is strongly believed to be a hard problem. We shall elaborate further on 362 this topics Section 4 and explain why, despite of these negative results, very large fault trees and related 363 models can be efficiently assessed, thanks to the coherence of models and to suitable approximations. The following theorem establishes the complexity of REACHABILITY.
366
Theorem 4 (Complexity of REACHABILITY [38] ). REACHABILITY is PSPACE-complete.
367
The above theorem asserts that REACHABILITY can be solved in polynomial space and that any 368 problem in this class can be reduced to REACHABILITY.
369
The good news is that, despite the fact that there may be a exponential number of reachable states,
370
one can decide in polynomial space whether a failed state is reachable. This result is obtained by 371 accepting to redo some calculations, i.e. pass several times by the same state. The bad news is that the above result is not very useful in practice and that it cannot anyway be applied to the calculation of the 373 probability of being in a failed state at time t. The following theorem formalizes this negative result.
374
Theorem 5 (Complexity of FSA-RELIABILITY). FSA-RELIABILITY is EXP-hard.
375
The key remark here is that the number of states on sequences leading to failed states may be 376 exponentially large with respect to the size of the problem. FSA-RELIABILITY is thus a hard problem, 377 with all respects.
378
As of today, two approaches have been proposed to solve FSA-reliability in practice: the 379 compilation of the model into a Markov chain and stochastic simulation.
380
A first approach consists thus in compiling, when possible, the model into a Markov chain, and As the reader may expect, the situation gets even worse for process algebra models. Namely,
397
almost any relevant question on these models is undecidable.
398
Theorem 6 (Complexity of PA-REACHABILITY). PA-REACHABILITY is undecidable.
399
The above result follows directly from results on severe restrictions of this general problem. For 400 instance, the reachability problem applied to Petri nets with inhibitor arcs is already indecidable [44] .
401
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that PA-RELIABILITY is also indecidable. variables, so-called basic events, and logical connectives "+" (or), "·" (and) and " " (not). Other 431 connectives such as k-out-of-n can be easily derived from those.
432
The calculation of all risk indicators is based on a basic step consisting in calculating the 433 probability of a Boolean formula f , given the probabilities of basic events of f , which is nothing 434 but the RELIABILITY problem stated in the previous section.
435
As f may contain repeated events, it is not possible in general to calculate p( f ) directly from f . f 436 must transformed into an equivalent normalized formula from which the calculation is possible. Two 437 normal forms have been proposed so far: sums-of-minimal-cutsets and binary decision diagrams. Starting from the initial fault tree (or from the master fault tree generated from a fault tree/event 440 tree model), one pre-processes the model to make it easier to assess. This first step involves notably the holds.
468
Property 3 (Sum-of-Minterms). Any Boolean formula is equivalent to a unique sum of minterms.
469
Let f and g be two formulas built over the same set of basic events. We denote by Minterms ( f ) 470 the sum of minterms equivalent to the formula f . We say that the minterm π satisfies the formula f , and 
476
Let π and ρ be two minterms. We say that π is smaller than ρ, which we denote as π ≤ ρ, if any 477 basic event that occurs positively in π occurs positively in ρ.
478
A Boolean formula f is coherent if for any two minterms π and ρ such that π ≤ ρ, π ∈ f implies 479 ρ ∈ f . It is easy to verify that any formula built only over basic events and connectives "+" and "." is 480 coherent.
481
Let π be a positive product. We denote by π the minterm built by completing π with the 482 negative literals built over basic events that do not show up in π. In other words, π is the smallest 483 minterm ρ such that ρ ∈ π.
484
A cutset of a Boolean formula f is defined as a positive product π, such that π ∈ f . A cutset 485 π is minimal if no sub-product of π is a cutset of f . We shall denote by MCS ( f ) the set (the sum) of 486 minimal cutsets of the formula f . The following property holds [45] .
487
Property 4 (Minimal Cutsets). Let f be a Boolean formula. Then f ⊆ MCS ( f ). Moreover: 
501
In theory, the calculation of the probability of a sum-of-minimal-cutsets can be performed thanks 502 to the Sylvester-Poincaré development.
503
Property 5 (Sylvester-Poincaré development). Let f = ∑ n i=1 π i be a sum-of-products. Then, the following 504 equality holds.
where the probability of a product is the product of the probabilities of its literals.
506
In practice however, the computational cost of this calculation method is prohibitive as it involves 507 the calculation of 2 n terms, where n is the number of minimal cutsets. Approximations are thus 508 performed:
509
-The so-called rare-event approximation that consists in considering only the first term of the 510 development.
-The so-called mincut upper bound approximation, which warranties, conversely to the rare-event 512 approximation, to get a result between 0 and 1.
Both approximations are accurate when the probabilities of basic events are small (say less than 514 10 −2 ). 
520
Binary decision diagrams rely on the pivotal or Shannon decomposition.
521
Property 6 (Pivotal decomposition). Let f be a Boolean formula and E be a basic event (occurring in f ).
522
Then the following equivalence holds.
where f E=v denotes the formula f in which the constant v has been substituted for the basic event E. hard disks).
540
One of the key features of binary decision diagrams is that they make the calculation of the top 541 event probability both exact (no approximation is required) and of linear complexity, thanks to the 542 following property (that results from property 6).
543
Property 7 (Pivotal decomposition applied to probabilities). Let f be a Boolean formula and E be a basic 544 event (occurring in f ). Then the following equivalence holds.
To compute the exact probability of the function represented by means of a binary decision 
Consequences of Computational Complexity Results
550
Let us summarize the situation by putting together computational complexity results reviewed in 551 the previous section and the algorithms presented above: 552 1. Fault trees can be assessed in two ways:
553
-Either by preprocessing the tree, extracting its minimal cutsets and then approximating the 554 top event probability from the minimal cutsets;
555
-Or by preprocessing the tree, building its binary decision diagram and then calculating the 556 exact top-event probability. 2. RELIABILITY is (strongly believed to be) a hard problem. 3. Preprocessing the tree, approximating the top event probability from the minimal cutsets, and 559 calculating the exact top event probability from the binary decision diagram are easy operations.
560
This implies that:
561
-Either extracting minimal cutsets is a hard problem, or obtaining a good approximation of the 562 top event probability from minimal cutsets is a hard problem, or both.
-Building the binary decision diagram is a hard problem.
564
These theoretical results are confirmed in practice: the three above operations are actually 565 intractable, at least if we take them in their whole generality. 
Approximations
567
At this point, the reader may think: "All right, this is for the problem in general, but in practice,
568
given the epistemic uncertainties on the system behavior, on its modeling and on reliability data, I'm just fine 569 with reasonable approximations." and she or he is right to think so. First, a probabilistic weight is defined on products as follows. Let π be a product.
That is w(π) is the product of the probabilities of positive literals of π.
591
Now, given a formula f a probability threshold τ, we can define the following restrictions of f 592 and MCS ( f ) with τ as follows.
The following property holds.
Moreover, under the condition that most of the basic events verify the inequality 3, the probability 597 of f at time t can be accurately approximated as follows (via the calculation of MCS ≥τ ( f )).
Let p lb be the probability of the basic event with lowest probability. number to select at most k items in a set of n items.
603
It follows that p REA ( f ≥τ ) (and p MCUB ( f ≥τ )) are polynomial approximations of p( f ). They can be 604 calculated via the two alternative algorithmic approaches described above: either by extracting only 605 the minimal cutsets whose probability is higher than τ or by calculating an approximated binary 606 decision diagram, cutting branches encoding a product π such that w(π) < τ, see [45] for more details.
607
In both cases, it is possible to track what has been discarded so to get an upper bound of the actual 608 probability.
609
This very positive result, which makes PRA/PSA of practical interest, should not hide the 610 epistemic problems it raises, due to the following paradox.
611
Assume we designed a model M at a given level of details. We calculated from M minimal cutsets
612
and relevant risk indicators with a probability threshold τ. As we did our job as correctly as possible,
613
we set up τ as low as possible for the available calculation power. 
618
But here come two problems. First, as M is larger than M and generates thus possibly many 619 more minimal cutsets than M, the probability threshold τ may be too small for M and the available 620 calculation power. We are thus forced to make the calculations with a coarser probability threshold τ
621
(τ > τ). Second, a minimal cutset π of M whose probability was above to the threshold τ, may be 622 decomposed into several minimal cutsets whose probabilities are below τ and therefore below τ . It
623
follows that these minimal cutsets will be discarded while assessing M .
624
We are thus in the following paradoxical situation.
625
Paradox 1 (Model refinement). The more refined the model, the lower the risk estimation.
626
By refining sufficiently the model, we could even make the (evaluated) risk vanish completely! 627
Handling Uncertainties on Reliability Data
628
Probability distributions of basic events of PRA/PSA models are known only up to an uncertainty.
629
This problem has many causes, including the scarcity of data, that have been discussed at length in the 630 abundant literature on this topics. We shall not attempt to review these contributions here, as they are 631 not at the core of our subject, but just have a look at how uncertainties are handled in practice when 632 calculating risk indicators.
633
To simplify the discussion, we shall assume that the mission time of the system is fixed and that 634 probabilities of basic events are calculated at this mission time. Saying that the probability p(E) of 635 the basic event E is known only up to an uncertainty, is saying that it belongs to a certain interval
The density of probability in this interval has no reason to be uniformly distributed.
637
It can be for instance normally distributed (taking into account truncations due to bounds) arround a 638 certain value.
Assuming given such interval (and density probability within the interval) for each basic event of 640 the model/formula f , we can attempt to characterize the uncertainty in the calculation of p( f ).
641
The range of variation of the probability of the formula can be significantly larger than 642 the individual range of variations of the probabilities of the basic events. To understand this 651 Extended probability theories make it possible to perform calculations efficiently. However, they 652 do not really solve the above problem. Moreover, determining the degree of belief or plausibility of the 653 failure of a component from field data is a quite difficult task.
654
With that respect, the Monte-Carlo simulation approach seems more practical. However, it is 655 extremely consuming in terms calculation resources. This is the reason why, simulations are usually 
Experimental Results
663
In order to illustrate the different points discussed in the previous section, we selected three large 664 models out of our benchmarks. These three models comes from the nuclear industry. These models 665 are extracted from PSA studies of an american and two european nuclear power plants (from two 666 different european countries).
667
The numbers of basic events and gates of these models are as follows. 1  1733  1304  2  2312  5346  3 2816 5583
668
PSA Model #Basic Events #Gates
669
Each of these models represents a group of sequences of an event tree model leading to a nuclear 670 accident (e.g. core melt). Models 1 and 2 are non coherent in the sense that they embed negated gates 671 and basic events to represent exclusive or impossible configurations, see e.g.
[46] for a discussion on 672 this issue.
673
We assessed these models with XFTA [10, 52] , the fault tree calculation engine the author develops 674 in the framework of the Open-PSA initiative [62, 63] . XFTA is a very efficient fault tree calculation Each row of the table corresponds to a different cutoff value. We took as cutoffs the negative 683 powers of 10, ranging from the first value for which at least one minimal cutset is produced to a value 684 where the top event probability is stabilized.
685
Note that the critical resource here is the memory rather than the computation time. Thanks to
686
XFTA data structures, it is possible to store about 60 millions minimal cutsets within our computer 687 memory. Beyond, the tool has to be configured specifically, which we did not want to do (we wanted 688 results to be reproducible with the distributed version of XFTA).
689
The columns of the tables report the following information.
690
-The first column gives the value of the cutoff.
691
-The second and third columns give the top event probability computed from the minimal cutsets 692 with respectively the rare event approximation and the mincut upper bound.
693
-The fourth column gives the number of minimal cutsets.
694
-The fifth column gives the number of different basic events showing up in the minimal cutsets.
695
-The sixth column gives, in percentage, the ratio of the value of the rare event approximation 696 obtained for the given threshold and the value of the rare event approximation obtained with 697 the lower cutoff we could calculate with (i.e. the value indicated in the second cell of the last row 698 of the table).
699
-The seventh column gives, in percentage, the ratio of the number of basic events showing up in 700 the minimal cutsets over the total number of basic events of the model.
701
-Finally, the eighth column gives the running time in seconds for the whole calculation. 110.00 1.00E-17 5.42730E-06 5. 42722E-06 7,320,431 2,192 137.40% 77.8% 205.00 The probability of the top event is not very impacted by this slight change in basic event 749
probabilities. The increases are respectively of 30%, 60% and 40%.
750
The numbers of minimal cutsets for each value of the cutoff vary in a similar way. There is an 751 increase, but this increase is not too drastic.
probabilities and not to the increase in the number of minimal cutsets, at least for the smallest values 754 of the threshold.
755
The picture changes radically when we consider a more significant change of basic events 756 probabilities. Tables 7, 8 and 9 report results obtained by multiplying by 2 the probabilities of 757 basic events of the three models. Note that such a variation, altought very significant, is not irrealistic
758
given the epistemic uncertainties on these probabilities. Now top event probabilities are respectively multiplied by 10, 26 and 17! The number of minimal 760 cutsets is also very significantly bigger for each value of the cutoff. However, as previously, the increase 761 in the top event probability is mostly due to the increase in basic event probabilities and not to the 762 increase in the number of minimal cutsets.
759
763
Some calculations that were possible become intractable. In any case, running times are 764 significantly increased.
probabilities of the basic events, we divide by a factor much greater than 2 the probability of the top 767 event.
768
Roughly speaking, if we consider, for each basic event E of "mean" probability p E the range
769
[p E /ρ, p E × ρ], for a certain factor ρ ≥ 1, then the top event probability will vary in the interval The results given in this section are puzzling and lead to the following paradox.
783
Paradox 2 (Feasibility of calculations). Although involving the resolution of theoretically intractable problems,
784
state of the art cutoff based algorithms make it possible to assess very large PRA/PSA models.
785
We could take this paradox just as another illustration of the famous quote: "In theory there is no 786 difference between theory and practice. In practice there is". But this is indeed rather unsatisfying, especially 787 because it is easy to exhibit trivial formulas for which the algorithms do not give any good results: For 788 any value of the cutoff τ, consider the disjunction of n similar basic events whose probability p is lower 789 than τ. Clearly, a cutoff based algorithm detects none of the singleton cutsets and therefore estimates 790 the probability of the formula to 0. However, by letting n growing, we can make the probability of the 791 formula arbitrarily close to 1, i.e. the error of the algorithm as big as we want.
792
This calls for a characterization of the formulas for which cutoff based algorithms work. This 793 could work as follows.
794
Let f be a formula built over a set of variables V and let τ be a cutoff value. We can split
795
Minterms ( f ) into two subsets:
796
-The set Minterms ≥τ ( f ) of minterms whose probabilistic weight is greater or equal to τ.
797
-The set Minterms <τ ( f ) of minterms whose probabilistic weight is less than τ.
798
The absolute error σ τ ( f ) and the relative error ρ τ ( f ) on the estimation of the probability of f made by a 799 cutoff based algorithm for a given value of τ can be characterized as follows. called the model refinement paradox: the more detailed the model, the lower the risk estimation.
833
Last, we reported the results of an experimental study on three large PSA models coming from 834 the nuclear industry. This study showed that in these models at least i) a few minimal cutsets (and 
844
The above theoretical and experimental results should not be taken as a criticism of the 845 probabilistic approach in reliability engineering. Just the contrary: by better understanding its 846 advantages and possible drawbacks, we delimit better its scope and make it a powerful and trustable 847 tool. With that respect, much remains to do in terms of mathematical, algorithmic and experimental 848 developments, to take a better benefit of this approach.
849
Assessing the risk in critical systems is and will remain a complex task. The analyst has definitely 850 to face aleatory and epistemic uncertainties and to face it with a limited computation power. This at stake is eventually how to be efficient in the modeling process given our bounded computation 853 resources.
